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RECENT DECISIONS
safety, and a later inspection, the purpose of which is to disclose evidence
necessary to a criminal conviction.' 2
The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Price is sound,
not only legally, but also practically. Legally, it is supported by a leading
United States Supreme Court case13 which holds that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not bar rea-
sonable searches, and that there is no fixed test for determining the rea-
sonableness of searches, but rather, that the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of a search depends in each instance upon the facts of the par-
ticular case. The support of the decisions in the Richards case, the Givner
case and the dissent in the Little case, in addition to the opinions of many
text writers,14 add weight to the court's opinion. Practically, the court's
decision is a commendable interpretation of public policy. There can
be no regulation by ordinance of the health and safety of a community
without an effective system of inspection.' 5 A decision contrary to that
reached by the Ohio Supreme Court might well have led to the harass-
ment of inspectors, thereby making ineffective a vital agency of the public
health and safety.
SHELDON I. BERNS
ZONING - EXTENSION OF USE DISTRICT WHERE A SINGLE
PARCEL IS WITHIN TWO USE DISTRICTS
A mandamus action' was brought to direct the issuance of a permit
to construct a building for retail use on land which, though under one
ownership, was divided into two use districts. If the permit were issued,
it would be necessary to extend the retail use.
The parcel fronts on Euclid Avenue, a main traffic artery in Cleve-
land, Ohio, and has a frontage of 281' and a depth of 673'. The Euclid
frontage was zoned for retail use to a depth of 140'. The rear was zoned
12. Under State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936), evidence of
guilt obtained through such an inspection would be admissable in Ohio, not respect-
ing the fact that such an inspection might be a violation of the occupant's constitu-
tional right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The occupant's
only right seems to be in treaspass against the inspector.
13. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
14. "The constitutional provision in question, while primarily designed to protect
the individual in the sanctity of his home and in the privacy of his books, papers and
property, does not apply to reasonable rules and regulations adopted in the exercise
of the police power for the protection of the public health, morals and welfare."
CORNELIUS, SEARCHEs & SEIZURES § 35 (2d ed. 1930). See 47 AM. JuR. Searches
& Seizures § 13 (1943); 79 C.J.S. Searches & Seizures § 6 (1952).
15. See Guandolo, Housing Codes In Urban Renewal, 25 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1956).
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for apartment house use. The rear line adjoins a railroad right-of-way.
The land on one side is zoned for apartment house use and is completely
built-up with apartment houses the ages of which are 25 to 35 years. The
land on the other side of the subject property is zoned for commercial
and light industrial use.
Three major issues are involved: one, is the request a proper subject
for a variance or does it necessitate an amendment to the zoning ordi-
nance? two, did the Board of Appeals abuse its discretion in either refus-
ing to grant relief to the relators or in refusing to recommend an amend-
ment to the ordinance? three, is the existing zoning a restriction which
is unreasonable and confiscatory and which thus constitutes a taking of
relators property without due process of law?
Taking these issues in order, the court held that, since the hardship
that has been created relates primarily to this particular piece of property,
an extension of the use district within this parcel is a proper subject for
a variance and did not necessitate an amendment to the zoning ordinance.
Secondly, the court held that the Board of Appeals did abuse its dis-
cretion; this abuse resulted from the Board's refusal to grant relief in the
face of the ordinance having become obsolete with the passage of time
and in the face of the enactment of additional zoning restrictions such
as off-street parking, loading docks, set-backs and rear yards having
seriously depleted the usable area of the retail frontage, and because no
clear cut policy for dealing with the extension of retail zone depths was
shown.
Thirdly, the court held that the physical and economic conditions in-
dicate that the rear portion of the parcel is not reasonably available for
apartment house use and the restriction is thus unreasonable and con-
fiscatory and is a taking of property without due process of law. 2
While the constitutional validity of zoning laws as an exercise of the
police power has long been established,3 there are several limitations be-
yond which these regulations may not extend. These limitations include
the necessity for the zoning plan to be comprehensive4 and to bear a sub-
1. State ex rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. City of East Cleveland, No. 24549, Ct. App.,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Oct. 8, 1958.
2. A minor issue arose concerning whether or not zoning ordinances can be used
to regulate or reduce traffic congestion. The court held that while zoning ordinances
are a proper means of alleviating parking problems by requiring off-street parking
facilities, it is unrealistic to prevent operation of a lawful business by restrictions in
a zoning ordinance simply because customers tend to generate traffic congestion by
arriving in autos. This is a police problem not a zoning proglem.
3. City of Eudid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pritz v. Messer, 112
Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
4. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842
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stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.5
Legislatures may not under the guise of the police power impose any un-
reasonable restrictions upon the use of private property. This does not
mean that some impairment of the full use of the property may not be
tolerated where that impairment is reasonably necessary for the preserva-
tion of public health and morals.6 A further limitation is that attempt
to control the use of property by city ordinances cannot cause such
pecuniary loss as will deprive owners of all the benefits of their prop-
erty.7 This deprivation need not occur when the zoning law is initially
created but may arise after a period of time when population shifts,
neighborhood changes, community growth and so on, have altered the
situation so that by the passing of time the restriction has become totally
destructive of the owners' rights in the property.8
Zoning is a legislative function. The legislative judgment must be
allowed to control if the legislative classification for zoning purposes is
only fairly debatable.9 It has been held that courts will not interfere
with the sound discretion of those upon whom rests the responsibility of
fixing the boundaries of zones unless the exercise of this function indi-
cates a wholly arbitrary and unreasonable action entirely foreign to any
consideration involving the health, safety, morals or welfare of the
public"1
Most zoning ordinances provide for the creation of a Zoning Board
of Appeals. The power of this board to grant variances from zoning
restrictions is of a discretionary nature and hence courts are properly
asked to take jurisdiction when a zoning board has abused its discretion
842 (1925); Westlake v. Elrick, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 538 (Ct. App. 1948); East Fair-
field Coal Co. v. Miller, 71 Ohio L Abs. 490 (C.P. 1955).
5. Smith v. Juillerate, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611 (1954); State ex rel.
Weber v. Vainer, 92 Ohio App. 233, 108 N.E.2d 569 (1952); Ottawa Hills Co. v.
Ottawa Hills, 41 Ohio App. 276, 180 N.E. 903 (1931); State ex rel. Clifton-High-
land Co. v. City of Lakewood, 41 Ohio App. 9, 179 N.E. 198 (1931); State ex rel.
Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1930); Cincinnati v.
Struble, 30 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 380 (C.P. 1933).
6. O0O CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; Smith v. City of Troy, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 476 (Ct.
App. 1934).
7. Ervin Acceptance Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 322 Mich. 404, 34 N.W.2d 11
(1948); State ex rel. Rosenthal v. City of Bedford, 134 N.E.2d 727 (Ct. App.
1956); Murdock v. City of Norwood, 3 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 278 (C.P.
1937).
8. Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 125 N.E.2d 355 (1954); Cleveland
Trust Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440 (1952).
9. Cleveland Trust Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440
(1952).
10. State ex rel. Rosenthal v. City of Bedford, 134 N.E.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1956);
Central Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139, 23 N.E.2d 450 (1939); Hardy
v. Horst, 101 N.E.2d 398 (C.P. 1951).
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by acting in an arbitrary, unreasonable or unjustifiable manner.1 While
the court in this case held that the extension of the use district on this
parcel was a proper subject for variance, it has been held that to extend
a use district is not a proper subject for a variance but rather necessitates
an amendment to the zoning ordinance by the legislature.' 2  By holding
that the extension of the use district was a proper subject for a variance,
the court could then judge the discretion of the Board of Appeals in re-
fusing to grant the extension. If it is not a proper subject for a variance,
it would seem that the court has usurped the legislative prerogative; the
court decided also, however, that the passing of time had so altered the
physical conditions of these premises and their surroundings that the
zoning restrictions had become unreasonable and confiscatory.'8 This
constitutes a taking of property without due process, and the relator
should be granted the permit whether the request is a proper subject for
a variance or not and whether the Board of Appeals abused its discretion
or not. The decision indicates that while the ordinance may not have
been arbitrary when the legislation was originally passed, a substantial
change in the physical surroundings of a particular piece of property
may well cause the legislative action to grow into the category of being
arbitrary. The 36 years since the passing of the original ordinance could
indeed have caused these circumstances to obtain.
Other decisions concerning parcels of land that lie within two zone
use districts indicate that while of necessity each case must be decided on
its own peculiar set of facts, the tendency seems to be to grant both the
legislatures and the boards of appeals broad powers with respect to the
restrictions that they may place and permit to remain on private real
property.' 4
11. 42 OHIO Jtn., Zoning and Zoning Laws § 14, at 813 n.7 (1936).
12. Kindergan v. Borough of River Edge, 137 N.J.L. 296, 59 A.2d 857 (1948);
Bd. of Adjustment v. Stovall, 218 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
13. Ervin Acceptance Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 322 Mich. 404, 34 N.W.2d 11
(1948).
14. It was held in Kindergan v. Borough of River Edge, 137 N.J.L 296, 59 A.2d
857 (1948) that because land lies partly in a zone in which buildings may be erected
and partly in a contiguous zone in which such buildings are prohibited, is not a
sufficient reason for a variance to be granted. The decision in Visco v. City of
Plainfield, 136 N.J.L. 659, 57 A.2d 490 (1948) declared that there is no obligation
upon the local legislative body to zone for business all of the land of the individual
owner, regardless of its depth; also, the delineation of such use districts by the local
legislative tribunal involved the exercise of a reasonable discretion controlled by the
statutory considerations and that there is no ground for judical interference unless
there has been arbitrary action. For a case similar to the subject case, see Ervin
Acceptance Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 322 Mich. 404, 34 N.W.2d 11 (1948),
wherein the land was next to property zoned for commercial use on one side while
the property on the other side was zoned for residential use; the zone boundary ig-
nored property lines and was irregular; it was held that the ordinance which so pro-
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Some zoning regulations include stipulations expressly intended to
assist in overcoming the difficulties arising from the division of lots by a
zone boundary line or from overlapping zones.15 It would seem that
wise legislation should include such stipulations in order that litigation
such as arose in this case might be minimized. This phase of zoning
seems to be somewhat of a stepchild in the house of professional plan-
ners and zoners whose advice is sometimes too carefully heeded by most
legislatures. The East Cleveland Zoning Ordinance contains no provi-
sions in this regard.
The decision in this case seems to call at least a partial halt to the
endless march of the forces of the state against the sometime rights of
private real property owners. While lip service is often paid to the
necessity for reasonable ordinances and reasonable uses of discretion on
the part of boards of appeals, the difficulties of changing the location of
zone use boundaries, once fixed, and the attendant costs of litigation
tend to enable municipalities to enforce provisions of zoning ordinances
that are not always as reasonable as the professional zoners and land plan-
ners advise.
The increased reaction against private property owners that began in
the early 1930's has tended to create an atmosphere in which more and
more restrictions against real property are enacted, and fewer and fewer
real property rights are protected. Under the guise of general welfare,
many highly restrictive zoning ordinances have been enacted. Zoning
boards of appeals, hesitant to abuse their discretion, have granted rela-
tively few variances from these restrictions, especially in situations in
which political expediency has entered the scene. The decision of the
court in this case would seem to indicate at least a partial change in the
atmosphere. In the rush for public ownership of the moon, it is well
that private property ownership, one of our most cherished rights, has
not been forgotten by all of the courts.
GEORGE M. WHITE
vided was unreasonable and confiscatory and illegal as applied to such property.
For several cases where the decisions of zoning boards of appeals were held vot to
be an abuse of discretion where property owners were refused variances which re-
quested extension of a use district to the rear of a parcel that had been divided by a
zone boundary line, see Visco v. City of Plainfield, 136 N.J.L. 659, 57 A.2d 490
(1949); Application of Wender, 89 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1949). But see Arditi
Realty Co. v. Murdock, 67 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
15. Anno., 159 A.L.R. 854 (1945).
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